THE ORIGINS OF PAN-SLAVISM

(An Attempt towards the Evaluation of the Slav Movements in thr First Half of the 19th Century)

by

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The successful accomplishment of unity in Italy and Germany, and the Compromise of 1867 in Austro – Hungary indicated the beginning of a new era in several regions of our continent. Friedrich Engels wrote at the time: "One cannot find a single country in Europe, where there are no different nationalities united under the same government ... neither a single borderline that would coincide with the natural borders of the nationalities, i. e. with linguistic boundaries, There are many people living outsied France whose mother-tongue is French, just like those outside Germany who speak German, and most probably this will remain so. It is a natural consequence of the slow and perplexed historical development that Europe has undergone the last thousand years that nearly every great nation has had to forsake some distant parts of her body; these fragments became separated from the life of the nation and often partook of the national life of another community that they began to belong to, indeed to the extent that they do not wish now to rejoin their original tribe. Swiss and Alsatian Germans have no more desire to be reunited with Germany than the French in Belgium or Switzerland with France. And ultimately, it is no small advantage that at the time of their political formation, these nations incorporated some foreign elements linking them to their neighbours and creating variety in the otherwise extremely monotonous uniformity of national character ..."[1]

In this article entitled "What Has the Working Class To Do with Poland?" Engels expounded the twofold movement of the origin and development of nations, viz. the effects of the centripetal and centrifugal forces. Following their own views, researchers of the topic have generally emphasided either the one or the other element of this approach. Consequently, historical research is especially disputable when, while discussing the process of national formation, international categories, implicitely supposing at the same time some kind of national unity at least, are to be considered.

Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Romanism, Pan-Europeanism...

These ideological systems have emerged from time to time during the past hundred and fifty years and have always created turmoil in unusually wide circles. Out of them, we have chosen Pan-Slavism for the subject of the present study, which is to be a short and polemically designed treatment of its formation, its rudimentary endeavours and various trends — a groups of problems not in the least settled, which more than once produced lasting ideological distortions in the past.

In international literature the contents and the extent of the concept of Pan-Slavism have not been precisely delimited. So much so, that the erroneous conception has prevailed to this day that, in the first half of the 19th century, i. e. at the time of its birth, Pan-Slavism was identical with the ideas and principles that formed the basis of the expansionary foreign policy of Tsar Nicholas I. This supposition can be found in the anti-Slav German and Hungarian works written after World War I as well as in more recent books with supranational intentions.[2]

Thus, apart from works written in the line of the apologetics of Pan-Slavism, the Hungarian Marxist historiography of the last decades, and especially Endre Arató, has also had to challenge those conceptions where the concept in question is not a scientific term of an instrumental character, but it is considered as a pejorative phenomenon from the outset. According to this latter view, Pan-Slavism was the political doctrine of the Slavs in general, and especially of those living in Hungary, who, inspired cheifly by St. Petersburg, were prepared unconditionally to support the territorial expropriatory demands of the "great white Tsar"; thus Pan-Slavism would serve as an ideology for the separatist endeavours of the Slavs at all times.

In reality, however, the heads of the state apparatus of the Russian Empire had hardly anything to do with Pan-Slavism. For his ascension to the throne in 1825, Nicholas I pursued an explicitely legitimist foreign policy, even as regards the East.[3] It was only in 1854, and even then merely for tactical reasons, when influenced by anti-Austrian feelings after the Crimean war, that, for a short time, he considered becoming a "Slav" sovereign.[4] But it was the same Nicholas I who, in 1848, the year of the upswing of Pan-Slav views, refused to permit his subjects to take part in the famous Slav Congress in Prague[5], which later, quite opposite to the original intentions of the majority of its organizers, was to become an important event in the European revolutions. And earlier, the Tsar had commanded the heads of the Department of Popular Education to write a circular letter prohibiting Russian scholars, and other travellers in general who held posts in Russian offices, to become involved in any kind of subversive activity that they might come across while journeying in the countries of the Habsburg Empire.[6]

It is true on the other hand, that there were some Russian politicians, scholars, journalists who, for emotional reasons or by cool calculation, encouraged and even supported the spread of Pan-Slav ideas within the

intellectual circles of the Habsburg and the Turkish Empires – which they regarded as the service of Russian foreign policy. For a revealing illustration of the standpoint of Slavophile circles in Russia, we might look into Rayevszky's testament, who was a pope of the Orthodox chrurch in Wien; the manuscripts of the recently published ducument offer rich source-material for the topic, concerning the years 1840–1860. Rayevsky was beyond doubt an active and very efficient agent of the militant Pan-Slav circles in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and he was only secondarily a temporary emissary of the Russian Ministry of Education and Foreign Affairs.[7] Characteristically, he had to maintain contacts with his supporters at home with extreme caution and circumspection, as such initiatives of Russian subjects in foreign policy were hardly viewed benevolently, not only by Nicholas I, but also by his successor Alexander II, who represented the so-called Slav course in the foreign policy of the 1870s.

In the first half of the 19th century, then, despite of beliefs obtaining even today in professional circles, Pan-Slavism cannot be identified with the "official Russian doctrine", to use the frequent expression of contemporary pamphlet literature. At the same time, although not part of imperial foreign policy, it became wide-spread as an ideology and a political program soon after its appearance and consolidation. However, even more than we do, contemporaries sensed that the concept and the underlying ideology were not homogeneous: depending on who applied it and how, Pan-Slavism could be a designation of both retrograde and progressive inter-Slav concepts.

The term first appeared in print in 1826, in the Latin grammar of Ján Herkel', published by the University Press of Buda; but we cannot exclude the possibility of its earlier use by the Slav intelligentsia of Latin erudition.[8] (In a similar way, e. g. the term "nihilism", according to common knowledge, came into use through Turgenev's novel "Fathers and Sons". In truth, however, the concept was only made wide-spread by it; as it turned out later, it had been well known already in the days of Pushkin.) We may expect similar surprises as regards Pan-Slavism, especially for its being of Latin origin.[9]

In the spirit of the Sapir-Whorffian theory of linguistic relativity, the contemporary interpretation of the term must be carried out parallelly, on two poles; in the respective sets of verbal usage of the adherents and the opponents of Slav unity. At the turn of the 1830s and 1840s, the majority of the contemporaries generally applied the term with an anti-Slav overtone, in a pejorative sense. This was of course in direct opposition to what Herkel' originally intended. There were two factors that encouraged its diffusion and surprisingly wide-spread and frequent application. Firstly, at the time of its appearance, i. e. after the Napoleonic wars, there were a few Western European politicians who feared anything that could bring a new start in politics; consequently it was with special attention that they followed whatever could endanger the "balance", and from the outset they were hostile to all virtually viable new ideologies and political programs.[10] Secondly, and partly in connection with the previous factor, it

was just at this time that the idea of Pan-Germanism gained ground in wider circles in Europe. Curiously, ideologies so contradictory to one onother in their intentions could flourish simultaneously in the European public and political thinking of the day.

Whereas, apart from a few exceptions, the idea of Pan-Slavism met stronger and stronger rejection in Western Europe, most Slav polemicists of the East, in their fervour against German and Hungarian politicians and ideologists, gradually came to accept the Slav idea (Slav community, Slav reciprocity) and referred to it more and more frequently by the summary term Pan-Slavism. The two, i. e. the ideology and its designation, did not necessarily coincide, but more and more they contained isomorphic elements, especially from the turn of the 1830s and 1840s onwards, when there was a gradual shift of the investigation, the assessment and the development of the inter-Slav connections from the domain of scholarship to the grounds of daily politics; or at least – parallelly – they shook off much of their abstract, "work-room doctrine" character.

By this time even special research in Slavistics had already passed beyond limits of pure scholarship. The progress in politics and science went on so closely in hand that many renowned Polish, Czech, Slovakian, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian politicians of the "Spring of Nation" actually pursued particular Slavistic studies – on widely differing levels, of course. However, it was not always the most authentic and exact trends of Pan-Slavism whose representatives were most welcome at the greater forums. E. g. two recognized scholars of the day, the conservative Macejowski and the democrat Lelewel took great efforts to substantiate Pan-Slav ideas with the latest achievements of science.[11] But in the 1840s, the many hundreds of the large Polish emigration were rather captivated by Towianski's obscure prophecies – which corroborates the observetion that thought of emotional motivation find their way easier and quicker to greater numbers of people than those requiring intellectual and mental activity.[12]

On the other hand, it is also erroneous to suppose that Pan-Slavism was exclusively made up of a line of Messianistic conceptions on an irrational basis, and as such, stood in the way of, or at least was indifferent to, Western European progress. Beside religious and mystical thoughts, Pan-Slav theories of scientific character actually produced many ideas that were in line with general progress. By the wake of the 1848 revolution, most Pan-Slav politicians – e. g. Czech Austro-Slavs – had undergone their political education and as a result, became adherents of bourgeois transformation. Although not always consciously, some of them were engaged in an attempt to bring about an independent market for their own nations, in some cases an independent state, and especially a cultural tradition of their own. The most eminent participants in this endeavour were the Polish emigrants with their great erudition in political law, the Austro-Slav Czechs and Slovenes, most constructive in practical economic matters, and the Croatian Illysrists, who had especially deep political foundations.

It is thus only from a congregate of rational and irrational elements that the shape of Pan-Slavism in the first half of the 19th century can be reconstructed. It must not be left out of account either, that Pan-Slavism was considered to be an anti-European trend by many of its adherents as well as by some outside obeservers in Western Europe (and also in the Hungarian Kingdom!). Still, underlying their slogans and their concrete program, there was an ideology deeply rooted in the same Western European philosophical tradition, and especially in the German ideas and thinkers who were most attacked by Pan-Slavists.

Among the misconceptions concerning Pan-Slavism, it is of great interest and importance, reaching far beyond itself, that it is Prague, agitated with real intellectual stir and turmoil in the 40s, as shown, e. g. in housing the Slav Congress, that was widely considered the exclusive birth-place of Pan-Slav ideology. This was the opinion of such wholly different contemporaries as Bakunin, the last who could be accused of Czech nationalism[13], and Pipin, the liberal historian with strong sympathy for the Slav idea.[14] The separation of Pan-Slavism from Western European ideologies first contributed to, but later hindered its development. It actually went on, simultaneously or with a few years' difference, in Vienna and Zagreb, Pest and Belgrade, Berlin and Moscow, Paris and Cracow — in places where Slav national movements raised their standards, emigrant or small students' communities came about, or where there were departments of Slav studies. There is another circumstance which is also instructive and often left out of account. Unlike the regional national movements of Slavs which were usually backed by a part of the peasantry, if not as their leaders, at least as their militants or sympathizers, the social basis of Pan-Slavism was made up by the scanty and exclusive layers of the intelligentsia, and less frequently by the bourgeoisie or bourgeois-oriented nobility in university towns or cultural centres. This is symptomatic of a kind of rootlessness and artificiality Pan-Slavism. Yet, its adherents, although of limited number and social range, were able to bring about a trend comprehending groups of many nuances and many kinds.[15]

As we could see, Pan-Slavism did not become the official ideology of a single state in the first half of the 19th century. Not even of the two independent European Slav states: in Russia it was no match for the doctrine "Orthodoxy, Absolutism, Populism" of Tsar Nicholas I and, characteristically, of his minister of education Uvarov, whereas in little Montenegro, interested as the royal family was in Pan-Slavism, conditions in many respects medieval made its diffusion impossible.

Apart from the months of the "Spring of Nations", politicians professing Pan-Slav ideas were not in majority in the local governing bodies of any of the provinces of the Habsburg Empire. This was even more true of the Turkish Empire; curiously enough, neither did the Serbian Principality, by the time only formally subordinate, embrace Pan-Slav ideas, although these ran close to Garashanin's conceptions decisively influencing the policy of the government. And why could not Pan-Slavism become a kind of "Slav freemasonry", calling forth and organizing illegal political

struggles in various regions of Eastern Europe? The main reason was, in all probability, the lack of a real socio-political background. That is why, among its adherents, we can find representatives of widely differing social layers; from small and middle land-owners taking up bourgeois mentality and aristocrats bound up with the court, through the rising prosperous bourgeoisie, to the enlightened intelligentsia and the retrograde clergy. This may also throw light on the sometimes staggering heterogenity of the names of the participants of the Slav Congress in Prague, who all took the solemn oath to the cause of Slav unity.[16]

But vague outlines, unformed and amorph conceptions were not all that made up Pan-Slavism in the first half of the 19th century. E. g. in 1848 to 1849, or more precisely in the 1849 period of the "Spring of Nations" it was through the acceptance of Austro-Slav slogans that citizens, who had followed divergent trands of Pan-Slavism in numerous countries or provinces, could be brought to a common platform of policy and action. Such adherents, or their spiritual heirs, of the transformation of the Habsburg Empire into a federal state of Slav predominance, headed by Palacky, the most renowned Czech politician of the 19th century (otherwise also a scholarly researcher of his Slav nation), took part together in the Slav Ethnological Exhibition in Moscow in 1867, by this also protesting against the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Thus they attempted to stir up artificially the idea of an Austro-Slav action, justified in many respects two decades earlier, but by this time more and more becoming anachronistic.[17]

In actual fact, it is characteristic of the ability for adaptation and survival of Pan-Slavism that it could prevail even at a time when it had no connections with concrete, definite, and common economico-historical traditions or religious communities. After the loss of the independence of Poland, part of the Polish emigration, backed by great numbers already from the end of the 18th century and rightfully to be considered an independent factor in European politics, also introduced Pan-Slav thoughts into their ideology; owing to the attraction of Russophilism and Austro-Slavism, they were also inclined to give up the thought of the complete restoration of Poland's independence. With others, e. g. Bakunin, it was the social components of the originally fluid Pan-Slav ideology that grew stronger and became, by the turn of the 1860s and 1870s. a "Slav socialist" program, and were even to find their way into his anarchist ideology.

What were the trends of Pan-Slavism in the 1840s, i. e. at the time of its birth? In Russia, as has been referred to, the Slavophiles, like their counterparts the Zapadniks ("Westernists") who professed social and political westernization, were unable to form an efficient organization worthy of being considered a political factor.[18] Even the term "Slavophile" was first used by the opposing party for this loose, friendly society, of course sarcastically at first; it entered literary language already as a neutral expression. Those concerned did not find it appropriate in the beginning, and they did not accept it until later, when actual Slavophile conceptions and thoughts began to appear in the originally exclusively Russophile and nationalistic ideology of most of its followers.

Opposite to common belief, the Slavophiles were far from being retrograde reactionaries professing the views of the court as regards the solution of social problems. Admittedly, some of them, e. g. the well-known journalists Pogodin and Seviryov, formed an active and militant power reserve of the ruling layer; it was owing, not to their lack of ambition, but to the definite refusal of the court, that they failed to attain to offices which could have provided effective power for them. However, the majority of the Slavophiles was of a different stock; appearing only at the turn of the 1850s and '60s, the draft reform-program of their leaders I. Akesakov, Samarin, Koshelyov concerning the abolition of serfdom and the provision of the peasantry to be liberated with a considerable part of the land cultivated by themselves, had existed in its rudiments much earlier, already at the time of Nicholas I, when even hopes for the realization of such a plan seemed wholly illusory.[19]

While the outlines of their ideology were being formed, the Slavophiles were united by the idea of the autonomy (samobitnost') of Russian development. This extremely abstract manifestation of nationalism was combined with a rejection of all possibility for a Western-type development. However, in an organic, or we could say "doublethink" manner, this was compounded with the honest sympathy for, and readiness to help, the Slavs in general, with the exception of the Poles.[20]

By the first half of the 1840s, the concepts of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism had merged in the eyes of the contemporaries. Even Herzen, whose free, uncensored Russian thoughts in the London emigration were a fearful menace even for the Tsar, wrote of the Slavophile circles in Moscow, in his otherwise precise and succinct description, as if the Slavophiles had been Pan-Slavs and the Pan-Slavs simply non-Russian Slavophiles.[21]

There was only one, although great, part of the Slavophiles that could be considered consistently to have followed the ideas of Pan-Slavism; in the Pan-Slav component of their ideology, however, they proved to be extremely passive, just as in their plans for the solution of the agrarian problem before 1855. The reason was obvious: the suffocating atmosphere had its mark on the formation of each positive program in the empire of Nicholas I; it was not advisable to stir up that frozen public life with conceptions or ideas. Not even during the Crimean War—when aside from Turkey, there was also Austria fighting against Russia—did the government always permit the publication of Slavophile works written in a Pan-Slav spirit, although it was only in their honesty, and not at all in any original conception, that they differed from those approved by the censors and submitting themselves to the current ideology.[22]

By the time of Alexander II's ascension to the throne, i. e. between the loss of the Crimean War and the liberation of the serfs, the activity of the Slavophile friendly circles had resulted in one thing which was more than could have been expected of their apotheosis of introversion and of their occasional connections with representatives of other Slav national cultures.[23] This was that they had gradually created a relatively large reading public for the Slavophile journals, which had become one of the

largest trends in contemporary journalism. This, in its turn, could produce, within its framework of active religious practice and emotionally motivated nationalistic aims, which were less barron than the official ideology, live connections and a considerable material basis for a potential Pan-Slav public life. Moreover, in the spirit of an ideology recognizably Orthodox, their approach to the Orthodox Church, which had a policy evenmore obscurant after the death of Nicholas I, made the Slavophiles, ξarlier counted among the opposition, presentable before the court (the activity of the Church in Russia traditionally intermingled with that of the state apparatus). All this paved the way for, and contributed to, the formation of the Slav Committees, brought about in order to coordinate and to codify the Slav connections within the nation and internationally. This, in its turn, naturally encouraged Slavophile activity, by now with purely Pan-Slav references and of purely political character.[24]

Nearest to the Slavophiles, also as representatives of the Pan-Slav ideology in Russia, stood in the 1840s the *Russophiles*. What posterity may chiefly appreciate is probably their efforts towards the popularization of Russian culture and science. Obviously, just as there is no "Pan-Slavism in general", we cannot speak of "the" Russophiles either, There is, however, one common feature in the thinkers of this trend, although their political programs often differed widely; and because of this they may rightfully be classed among the opponents of universal progress. This feature is the fact that they trusted their political plans and expectations, not to an "abstract" Russian people, but to the most reactionary, and thus only too concrete, great power of Europe.

Curiously enough, the diffusion of even Russophilism in Eastern Europe was ultimately prevented by the narrow-minded rigidity of the Russian government. Even such a fanatic Rusophile as the Czech Hanka was astonished at St Petersburg's refusal of regular aid. It was not occasionally granted stipendia, smaller allowances or presents the occasional sending of certain periodicals and books that Czech, Slovak and mainly Southern Slav Russophiles (chiefly the Bulgarians studying and some of them settling down in Russia) hoped to receive from the Tsar's Empire.[25]

These Pan-Slavs conceived of the future Slavs as united in an all-Slav empire under Russian leadership. The followers of Russophilism based their conceptions, partly on the Orthodox Messianistic sense of mission ("after Rome an Constantinople came Moscow as the Third Rome; and a fourth Rome will not come!") and partly on the more practicall consideration that the fate of Eastern Europe would in all probability be more and more dependent on the Russian state, which tended to have the greatest army on the continent at its disposal. The awe-inspiring governing techniques of absolutism, the anachronism of the social system and the self-outlived institution of serfdom—all these, in the eyes of the Russophiles, were eclipsed by the dream that a huge all-Slav community may come about, stretching from the Elbe to Alasca, where all previous conflicts between the Slavs would vanish without trace.

The theory of *Slav cultural reciprocity* preserved much of the thoughts of Herder and Schlösser, and if it can be linked to more "political" Pan-Slavism, then only indirectly and in a roundabout way. Its recognized leader, all over the Habsburg Empire and even beyond, was Jan Kollar. Owing to his symbolic and pathetic work "Slavy dcera" (The Daughter of Glory), and his not less effective activity as a journalist, he became the initiator of a Pan-Slav movement with aims of greater foresight, and in part the creator of an autonomous cultural process.[26] Kollar and many advocates of the trend, felicitously also called *cultural Pan-Slavism*, protested for tactical reasons against current political considerations; that was why they objected to evaluations generally connecting the move ment with Pan-Slavism. But as so often in history, a rejected appellation, or even whose opposite was professed by the adherents of a movement, was ultimately to gain validity (we refer here only to the acceptance and the rejection of *democracy* and *dictatorship*, and partly in connection with this, to the change in the extent and contents of these concepts in the 19th and 20th centuries.).

In its ideology, Slav cultural reciprocity differed from more political varieties of Pan-Slavism in so far as its scope of activity confined it almost exclusively to the various scholarly institutions and cultural workshops. It was probably due to the limits of its resulting meagre framework and slight forms of activity that few followers of this trend were not simultaneously adherents of another Pan-Slav movement which offered immediate political aims, notably of Austro-Slavism, Russophilism, or Illyrism.

The basic experience of those professing a Slav cultural community was that they were fulfilling a cultural mission. This sense of vocation thus made them some kind of a catalyzer for the rest of the Pan-Slav movements e.g., even the relatively isolated Russian Slavophiles knew by heart Kollar's program article which, curiously, appeared in Russian just in the periodical of the Russian Westernists. Owing to their aims and the contents of their activity, they were less in conflict or in bitter argument with the other Pan-Slav movements, and so they could leave a comparatively more lasting impression. However, the standard of the works they wrote is extremely heterogeneous; they ranged from dreamy dilettants to great scholars and the precursors of the comparative science of today.

The effect of the ideology of Slav cultural reciprocity was, however, rather contradictory and double-edged. It was not always favourable for, but it occasionally ran counter the formation of the Slav national cultures, in decelerating their development and partly directing them onto new courses. That its role became so dubious was because some influential Russian, Polish, Czech, or Croatian Slav ideologists identified their own national cultures with that common to all the Slav nations, or at least sought to base the latter on the former. They interpreted Slav cultural reciprocity in such a way as if some national cultures should be elaborated for, or rather forced upon, Slav communities and groups less self-sufficient in culture-building (e. g. the Ruthenian), or nations with most of their energy fighting for national independence (e. g. the Bulgarians).

Illyrism was that branch, or current, of Pan-Slavism which produced perhaps the most harmonious proportions in political, scientific, and cultural endeavours. Gaj, the greatest apostle of Illyrism, also dreamed of a great unified Slav state, but of course he sought to realize it on the Balkan peninsula, and with foreign support—first Austrian, then Russian, then again Austrian—, but under Croatian leadership at any rate. As for the future of this Illyrian state, which was to contain the southern and southwestern parts of the Habsburg Empire as well as the Slav-inhabited territories of the Balkan, there were followers of this liberal rather than conservative trend who sought to realize quite radical social concepts.[27]

Conspicuously, a kind of political and geographical particularism characterized this trend. Compared to the other varieties of Pan-Slavism, it had plans on a smaller scale, but with not so overwhelmingly irrealistic perspectives. This can be accounted for partly by the greater practical sense of the Croatian politicians, and partly by the Catholic church, whose rule reduced exaggerated illusions to nil right in the beginning. Recognizing and representing national character as it did to a certain extent, the Croatian clergy was subordinated not only to Rome, but, inpractical moves, also to Vienna. Thus it could not be such a bastion of Slav endeavours as was the Orthodox church, which, also relegating the Greek priests into less important roles, often provided useful background for the Serbian and Bulgarian national movements.

But even though the Catholic clergy was not unanimoustly behind them, Illyrism had another support; the live tradition of the early medieval Croatian state, showing itself above all in the feudal self-awareness of the nobility, artificially maintained even in the century of bourgeois transformation. In spite of its several, seemingly conservative outward features, this consciousness was progressive in its contents, viz. in its aims and the tasks it undertook in forwarding national development.

It may be instructive if we briefly recall the development of Illyrism. Beyond doubt, the Croatian politicians had formed an independent Pan-Slav current at the beginning of the 1840s. However, at the time of the "Spring of Nations", in actually representing, or imagining to represent, local interests, they gave up a good number of their original views, and approached Austro-Slav ideology to such an extent that Illyrism was beginning to annihilate itself as an autonomous ideology. At the same time, it was fortified in the battles of '48 as an autonomous political trend.[28]

It was members of the Croatian, and in part Slovenian, intelligentsia, bourgeois-oriented nobles, and educated merchants who constituted the basis of Illyrism. On the other hand, the *conservative Polish emigrants*, who regarded Pan-Slavism as a political instrument mainly for the regions of the Balkan, were almost exclusively nobles, and as such, this group was socially far more homogeneous.[29] Yet, their political techniques and diplomatic erudition were not so much characteristic of this class, but already rather of the period of capitalism after the Great French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. This can also be seen from the way how resolutely and with how much tact were, after the suppression of the resurgence in

1830 to 31, the conservative emigrants, led by Adam Czartoryski, seeking to reconcile their concrete political conceptions with those of (a) those Serbian politicians who were not hostile to all-Slav ideas, (b) the the ideologues of Illyrism, and later (c) some followers of Austro-Slavism as well – all in order to forge a European coalition against the Tsar's policy in Poland. At the same time, a young generation that had been brought up in the spirit of "Extra Poloniam non est vitae" found itself unexpectedly in, and unprepared for, emigration, and in concrete political activity was forced to admit, even recognize to some extent, the existence of Slav reciprocity in some regions of Europe. But as the years passed, it was not merely under the impelling circumstances, but more and more from internal motivation, that they looked for, and found connections with other trends of Pan-Slavism as well.

Explicitely conservative as regards their aims and designs for a new society, the Polish emigrant groups did not objectively stand in the way of progress in international politics. This seemingly contradictory situation is well represented by the Slav policy of a Polish emigrant group called Hotel Lambert. It was not only with the non-official support of several diplomats as well as by the international connections of some aristocrats who were members of the group, but also by means of their huge network of agents and through "reliable" Poles living in Slav-inhabited territories that they could continually fight against the autocratic state apparatus of the Tsar, mainly from their centre in Paris. And on the Balkan peninsula, occasionally diverging from the generally pro-Turkish Polishpolicy, they largely contributed to the cultural development of the Southern Slav peoples.[30]

Besides, among the emigrants led by Czartoryski, there were truly *altruistically Slavophile Poles* as well, less keen on politico-tactical considerations. This attitude was the direct continuation of a conception of Slavdom which effectively influenced the Polish intelligentsia in the 1820s. Obviously originating from Enlightenment ideologies, it may be considered a precursor rather than an early variant of Pan-Slavism. We may perhaps call this peculiar conception "emotional Slavophilism" or "late-enlightenment Pan-Slavism". It never grew into a movement; its adherents – e. g. J. Potocki, to mention only the most renowned – naturally reserved the dominant role for the Poles in a would-be Slav community. Their activity, however, was primarily of scholarly character; this was one more reason why they could not be very popular, after the defeat of the resurgence in 1830 to 1831, among the emigrants desirous of political action. Even so, the impression they made was long lasting, in the articles on Slav topics of both the conservative and the democratic Polish emigrant press.[31]

The main reason why part of the Polish emigrants outside these groups still adhered to Pan-Slavism was their nostalgia for a great and a strong community; what they envisaged in it was a possibility for "belonging somewhere". Interestingly enough, the groups of Polish emigrants, exclusive and of small membership, assimilating with the people of the recipient countries only with difficulties or not at all, gave birth to an

opposite attitude at the same time. The sense of being outcast often resulted in collective depression, and in this case the irrational core that was undoubtedly to be found in Pan-Slavism did not prove to be sufficient. This attitude towards the world provided the background for the ideology called Polish or *Slav-Polish Messianism*, which had become a part of Polish cultural history, above all through the works of Adam Mickiewicz. Hardly could this trend show anything positive, apart from the literary and scholarly oeuvre of the great Polish poet; it was all about – more than half a century after the appearance of the great works of the Enlightenment! – obscure prophecies by Mickiewicz and mainly by Towianski, on the devine mission of the Polish nation and on the territories inhabited by the Slavs as its scene of realization – passively absorbed by the followers of Polish-Slav Messianism.[32]

Opposing this Messianistic creed right in its essence, the *Austro-Slav ideology* was, beyond doubt, the largest and, besides Russian Slavophilism, the most viable current of Pan-Slavism in the first half of the 19th century. Influential already before the '48 revolutions, this conservative trend with liberal elements had mainly Czech, Croatian, Slovenian, and partly Slovak and Galician Polish scholars – primarily Safarik and Palacky among them –, as well as journalists and, what is especially important, active politicians among its followers.

Before 1848, the Austro-Slavists from the various Slav nations and groups had not made as much as an attempt to bring about a unified society or a party. Still, what lent this ideology the character of a movement was the fact that its background was made up by the bourgeoisie and bourgeois-oriented nobility of the particular Slav nations (which did not alter with the temporary joining of some Bohemian aristocrats who wished to resuscitate the feudal traditions), and that its adherents had one purpose in common; inter-Slav separation, strictly within the Habsburg Empire, but without Austrian supremacy.[33]

Thus it is easy to understand that the bourgeois ideologists of Austro-Slavism, especially Palacky, strove for the monopoly of the idea of evolution, by consciously smoothing class antagonism and by bringing about as wide a unity of interests as possible.[34] However, the elaboration of tactics already resulted in the differentiation of Austro-Slavism. Opposing L. Thun, who was in sharp polemics against the German and Hungarian national movements, and instead of the generally conservative conceptions of the nobility, the Austro-Slavists were planning the cultural, and indirectly political, development and leading role of the Slavs. At the same time, they were aiming much higher, and at something far more comprehensive, than any national program, however wide it may have been. As to why they considered the given framework of the Habsburg Empire appropriate for bringing about a state with Slav supremacy, the answer must be sought in economic interests; the Habsburg Empire was an established market for the products of a large part of commodity producing nobility and bourgeoisie, Czech, Slovenian and, at the beginning of the 1840s and after 1849, Galician alike. This way, it is perhaps this trend of Pan-Sla-

vism where relations were the most immediate between the various social classes and strata (the given strata of the nobility and the bourgeoisie), and among the intelligentsia representative of their interests in the establishment.

Prior to the "Spring of Nations", the Austro-Slavists had brought the irrational elements to a minimum when they described their conceptions, whose three main pillars were (a) an acceptance of the Habsburg-Lotharingian dynasty, (b) Slav predominance within the Empire, and (c) federalism. Apart from the first, these demands may indeed be brought into relationship with the various anti-feudal theses of bourgeois transformation.

A further question that may arise is this: what was the relationship between Austro-Slavism and the ideologies of the particular Slav nations? It would be erroneous to set up a hierarchy exclusively of superordination and subordination. In fact, however, the most renowned followers of the Austro-Slav ideology – both in their function as professional politicians of national movements, and as well-known scholars, writers, artists of national cultures – were seeking to retain, by all means, the national motives of their vocations, aims, and entire activity. But at the same time, they occasionally strove to be the advocates of the common interests usually of the Austrian Slavs, and less frequently of the Slavs in general.

Then came 1848 which was a dividing line in the development of Austro-Slavism. There was a time when historiography in Hungary laconically condemned, with retrospective extrapolation, the pro-Habsburg policy of the Austro-Slavists in 1848 to 1849. This policy was the conglomerate of many strategic moves, that were imposed on them by tactical considerations, and which they intended to re-interpret in the long run. However, if we wish to arrive at a correct historical evaluation, it seems more to the point here to carry on synchronic, rather than diachronic, research. This results here in the conclusion that from the viewpoint of universal progress, in the Eastern Europe of the 1840s, but especially of the second half of the decade i. e. after the recession of relatively conservative sections within the particular Pan-Slav trends – Austro-Slavism was essentially *a variety of European liberalism*, supporting social and judicial reform programs. (E. g. it would be extremely instructive to compare the program of the Czech liberal Austro-Slavs with the ideology of the representatives of Hungarian liberalism, with that of those Germans fighting for the unification of Germany who admitted of liberal principles, and even with the aims of a similar wing of the Risorgimento – with regard, of course, to divergent development and different conditions. Identities and differences thus revealed would be especially fruitful for a methodology which, although indispensible for similar reesearches, has been little elaborated to the present day.)

Before 1848, the adherents of Austro-Slavism had had actual merit both in bringing the particular Slav peoples to national awareness, and in proclaiming, investigating as well describing the common features of the Slav cultures, the possibilities of reciprocal influence, and the recognition

of interdependence. From 1848 on, however, all this failed to prove sufficient for the movement to remain within the current of European progress. What had even earlier been the greatest limit of the Austro-Slavists – viz. that they stood for the Habsburg Empire as a given framework, and for Habsburg rule within it – had become, after the victory of the revolutions, their dominant motive, turning their whole ideology to a retrograde direction. But their faith in the role of the Habsburg dynasty regarding the future of the Slavs could not deprive them, even now, of their sensibility towards international politics, and even towards social problems. Moreover, under the influence of more radical elements in the national movement, the Austro-Slavists soon started to find insufficient the social reforms that had been extorted from the Habsburgs in the spring of 1848 by all the nations of the Empire. At the same time, they were obviously undermining the principle of centralization, which was a pillar of Habsburg absolutism, by working out principles for a federative transformation. Identification with the Empire, however, proved such an essential and all-determining feature of Austro-Slavism that, according to their ultimate ideological determination and so, more often than not, opposite to their original conceptions, they contributed to the solidification of the power of the Habsburg-Lotharingian House from the autumn of 1848 on. The latter's aim was to re-establish part of the pre-revolutionary conditions – viz. absolutism – ; by this, the Austro-Slavists irrevocably became the co-fighters of the triumphant European counter-revolution. Most of them were dreaming of an empire with important constitutional credits and almost ruled only symbolically by the Emperor, uniting huge territories in Middle-Eastern Europe, where the most important reforms necessary for bourgeois transformation would also be realized without any conflicts. In the hope of such a future they provided the Habsburgs with actual and considerable support – a dynasty that was an open enemy, not all only of the German, Austrian and Hungarian revolutions, but also for the Slav movements for independence, and even of their mere search for relations – thus of any Pan-Slav ambitions.[35]

It follows then from what we have said above that, in some form, Pan-Slav ideology was part of both the conservative and the liberal movements, in the first half of the 19th century, and especially in the '40s. Even among the Slav politicians and thinkers who were trying to realize democratic programs, there were some who thought of the cultural and political relations of the Slavs as dominant features in a future Europe. It seems justified to regard these politicians the followers of a trend we might call *democratic Pan-Slavism* and which we presume to have had a distinct ideology. Naturally, far be it from us to classify all radically minded Slav politicians under this heading; only those belonged here who focused their political programs on uniting the Slavs *in a revolutionary way*. While recognizing the cultural community, as it were reciprocity, of the Slavs, they creatively incorporated in their ideology elements of radicalism stemming from Western European soil. Partly in accordance with this, their methods for the solution of the agrarian problem were more favourable for

the peasantry than those professed by the liberals; and as concerns international questions, they firmly rejected the possibility of alliance, even temporary or for tactical reasons, with the Habsburgs and/or with the Romanovs.

In this way, the *horvatska levica*, led by D. Kuslan and M. Prica, cannot be regarded as having belonged to demoratic Pan-Slavism – not even for the fact that this radical left-wing movement had extremely progressive views concerning the solution of social problems. Its adherents, however, due to the changes in Hungarian – Croatian relations, were reluctant to break with the policy of the Habsburgs – which led them to regard Ban Jelačić the apostle of Slav struggles for liberty in the summer and autumn of 1848, and it was only at the turn of 1848 and 1849 that they admitted their mistake.

Who were then, in the final analysis, the first formulators and followers of democratic – or revolutionary – Pan-Slavism in Eastern Europe? Are we justified also to include *the struggles of Slav concern of the left wing of the Russian Decembrist movement?* Namely, it was the conception of the leader of the Southern Society, Colonel Pestel (who was later executed) and of his select circle that, once the resurgence was victorius, they would make war on Austria and Turkey; Slav-inhabited territories thus liberated would have joined Russia on a federative basis. Pestel's plan for a Slav-Russian federation had a stimulating effect, at the turn of the 1840s and 1850s, both on Herzen's "Slav socialism" conception and on Bakunin's democratic Pan-Slav ideology.[36]

As for the *antecendents* of Pan-Slavism, a small Decembrist community deserves special attention: originally a masonic lodge, it took the name *Society of United Slavs.* (Later it fused with the Southern Society, always the more radical within the whole movement; then its name became *Slav Directorate.*) Among its members there were young officers of radical disposition who sympathized with the struggles for independence of the Slavs and Greeks in Turkey; they had neither considerable knowledge of, nor deeper relations with, the Slavs. Nothing can be more illustrative of this than the fact that, they blindly believed, from the narrative of a Polish aristocrat of rich fantasy, that the Slav inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire showed strong national resistence. Moreover, they appear to have counted the Hungarians among the Slavs as well.[37]

Nevertheless, the plans, preserved through oral reports, of Pestel and the leaders of the Slav Directorate mainly for the formation of a Russo-Slav alliance were doubtless part of the antecedents of democratic Pan-Slavism in Russia. That these plans were the *antecedents*, and not an earlier variety, of the movement, can be seen from their extremely abstract and construed character as well as from their romantic withdrawal from reality to a much greater extent than any of the later, and actual trends of Pan-Slavism.

On the other hand, doubtless part of democratic Pan-Slavism, the ideology of the *Ukrainian St Cyril and St Methodius Society* had two principal aims, one resulting from the other: to gain national independence for

the Ukraine, and to bring about a loose Slav confederation. However, although much more concrete than the conceptions of the Decembrists, this program could only have incoplete theoretical foundations, because of the geographical and mainly political distance from the Slavs in Austria and Turkey, and for the lack of unbroken contact with the Russian Slavophiles. We will illustrate the consequences this could lead up to only with one example. Even such a consistent leading figure of the left wing of the secret society as the poet Taras Shevchenko considered as eminent Slav patriots the conservative Russophile Hanka and the liberal Austro-Slav Šafařik alike.[38]

Apart from this, Pan-Slavism was organically incorporated in the program of the Ukrainian national fighters. And this for the reason that two huge empires, the Romanovs' and the Habsburgs', should have simultaneously suffered serious defeats from without and social cataclysms from within, for the Ukraine to gain – or in their words, regain – her independent state. At the same time, the members of the St Cyril and St Methodius Society received no actual support from any of the European great powers, owing to the particularism of their aims, at least from a European viewpoint. They could only hope, not without some Messianistic faith, for an alliance of the "Slav brethren". It was in a United States of the Slavs, to the pattern of the United States of Northern America, that they thought to find the framework that could help the Slav community grow into an efficient and strong power on the continent, and in which the traditional Russo-Ukrainian, Polish-Ukrainian, and Polish-Russian antagonisms could gradually pass away.[39]

In these plans, it can be clearly recognized what the main criterion of the Pan-Slav programs was – in non-religious guise, yet of mystical character: it was to design the future, regarded as independent of the present, or the present, regarded as merely a preparatory phase towards the future. This abstractness and artificiality of plans diminished in the activity of the St Cyril and St Methodius Society, when in 1847 more real and live questions came to the foreground. The problem of propagandizing among the people, and of involving Russian elements in the activity of the secret society had a sharply polarizing effect on the movement; this would have led to total schism and probably to the formation of a new liberal and of a democratic society – had it not been for the wave of arrests that the two dozens of the inner circle members and many sympathizers fell prey to. In actual fact, as could be seen from the investigation and the verdicts, it was not advisable even to dream of a Slav unity that would cross the intentions of the authorities in Nicholas I's Russia; those suffered the most from the vengeance of the Tsar who were committed to democratic Pan-Slavism – as e. g. the poet Shevchenko.

The other groups in the current of democratic Pan-Slavism had features similar to the ideology of the St Cyril and St Methodius Society. This is partly the result of reciprocal influence: it can be well shown that e. g. *the great Polish revolutionary historian Lelewel and his groups* integrated the theoretical and historical attitude of Czech Pan-Slav scholars in their

evaluation of Slav questions; on the other hand, the Russian Mihail Bakunin would hardly have become the most famous ideologue of democratic Pan-Slavism, had it not been for the influence of Lelewel.[40]

It was most characteristic of the followers of Pan-Slavism that they regarded themselves as democrates above all. They were planning the future of the Slav national movements in accordance with the general aims of European progress. Before March, 1848, it was an approach between the very small group of Russian emigrants and the left wing of the Polish emigration, that provided the framework of organization for the trend. This approach meant several negotiations and common participation in mass meetings. On such occasions the idea was often raised that a union of organization of the democratic Slav movement would be necessary. This can already be considered to have gone further than the earlier idea of an anti-autocratic alliance of the Russians and the Poles.

But the full development of democratic Pan-Slavism can be dated only after March, 1848. From a system of views growing into a movement, it owed its three best known documents to *Mihail Bakunin*. His "Foundations of a New Slav Policy" was an improvization that came about during the Slav Congress in Prague in June, 1848. The author had just joined the Slav movements; consequently, for tactical reasons, he concealed his radical ideas. Similarly moderate was, as compared to his radical ideology, Bakunin's "Appeal to the Slavs" written shortly afterwards. Here in the background, however, it was rather through a concrete move that tactical considerations were involved; Bakunin wanted to initiate an anti-Habsburg alliance, as wide as possible, of the Slav politicians who were of widely differing social classes and strata. In his private correspondence, e. g. with George Sand, at the time of writing his Appeal, Bakunin considered the agrarian proletariate as the future power-reserve for the Eastern European, and thus Slav, revolutions.[41] In front of the Slav public, however, he was content to profess liberal wiews. Curiously, it was the German democrats who encouraged him to write, and who gave him material support to publish, his "Appeal to the Slavs", a famous proclamation which contained several militantly anti-German items! The polemics that followed the proclamation – which was joined by many, e. g. Palacky and Havlicek in Bohemia – developed into something more than originally intended by its author, i. e. a means for convincing the Austro-Slav politicians. Namely, it accelerated polarization between radicals and liberals within the Czech movement, and indirectly influenced the standpoint of the Croatian left wing. Its effect was not limited to the Slav movements; it was owing to Bakunin that a number of Western European journalists, traditionally alien to Pan-Slav ideas – e. g. Proudhon-, became conscious of the difference between "drawing-room" and "revolutionary" Pan-Slavism.[42] At the same time, the obscure items in democratic Pan-Slavism and its vague class character led to Engels famous criticism in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung.[43]

Nor was this movement static; in the spring of 1849, again mainly in the writings published by Bakunin, more and more emphasis was laid on

radical democratic aspects and such internationalist elements "surpassing" the Slav standpoint as e. g. the idea of a revolutionary Hungaro-Slav and German-Slav alliance suggested for the case of a new revolutionary tide. This viewpoit was shared, though not always with theoretical foundation, by several Czech and Polish adherents of democratic Pan-Slavism in spring, 1849. There are several indications that, by May 1849, i. e. at the time of the failure of the so-called "May conspiration" annihilated by Austrian authorities, Bakunin and his companions had got as far as a complete break with the various ideological movements of Pan-Slavism.[44]

Finally, we may put the question, what progress can we recover in the development of Pan-Slavism? Before the "Spring of Nations", and during its first few months, there was a great—both instinctive and partially conscious—approach between its various trends. Beyond doubt, it culminated in the first two weeks of June, 1848, in the euphonic Slav Congress in Prauge, originally intended by the organizing Austro-Slav politicians to be an anti-German and anti-Hungarian demonstration of power of the Slavs of the Habsburg Empire. But as the revolutionary spirit of Europe began to penetrate the atmosphere in Prague, it was no wonder that by the end of the conference little was discussed of realizing Slav unity in the Austro-Slav way. This was also owing to participants from beyond the boundaries of the empire who, with some Polish politicians from Poznan and with the Polish emigrants living in Western Europe, with the immensely popular Bakunin among them, were catalyzers as well as collaborators of the Congress' shift to the left. It was under their influence that many important demands of the bourgeois revolutions subsequently found their way into the basic documents of the conference.

However, after Windischgrätz and his guns had put an end to the first official inter-Slav conference, and Europe had been swept over by a counter-revolutionary tide, all the slogans of the Prague Congress seemed to have lost their validity. All the more so, as the participiant Slav politicians, who had been under the influence of radical ideas there, were once again mainly committed to the particular interests of their own nations. In the meantime, there was again strong polarization within Pan-Slavism. While not even the most conservative delegates had consented to re-establishing pre-revolutionary conditions at the Congress, from the late summer and autumn of 1848 on, it was with the undebatable centre of European reaction, i. e. the Habsburg dynasty, that a good number of Slav politicians, earlier with progressive views, started to seek connections. Later, two other rearrangements of power followed, mainly among Austro-Slavists and Illyrists, who were deeply disappointed in the dynasty. The first took place after the proclamation of the imposed constitution, the second in the period following the victory of the counter-revolution at Világos.

This slow decline, however, did not lead to the total fade-out of Pan-Slavism. The memory of the Prague Congress, the nostalgia for a political and cultural community were deeply absorbed in the traditions of the various Slav national movements. It was the principles laid down in Prague

in June, 1848, that, in the 1850s and 1860s, almost all the Slav politicians who had liberal and radical ideas sought to translate, each after his own style and his own purposes, into the language of the new era. This is the period of the second growth of Pan-Slavism, which can be fully understood only in the knowledge of its origins. And it is to the same Pan-Slavism, formulated in the 1840s, that the influential neo-Pan-Slavism of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries can be traced back, whose development and progress to the present day has been even less investigated than the genesis of Pan-Slavism.

NOTES

[1] *Marx, K. – Engels, F. – Lenin, V.:* A nemzeti kérdésről. (On the National Question.) Budapest 1965. 116.

[2] Elaboration and evaluation in connection with the problem are: *Arató, E.:* Kelet-Európa története a 19. század első felében. (The History of East-Europe in the first half of the 19th century.) Budapest 1971., and *Niederhauser, E.:* A nemzeti megújulási mozgalmak Kelet-Európában. (Renewal of National Movements in East-Europe.) Budapest 1977.

[3] *Riasanovsky, N.:* Nicolas I and the official nationality in Russia 1825–1855. Berkeley – –Los Angeles 1959.

[4] *Козьмин, Б. П.:* Николай I. и Маццини в 1854 г. In: Из истории общественных движений. Москва. 1957. 437–455.

[5] *Францев, В. А.:* Приглашение русских на славянский съезд в Праге в 1848 году. In.: Голос минувшего 1914/5. 238–240.

[6] *Покровский, М. Н.:* Дипломатия и войны царской России в XIX столетии. Москва. 1923. 108.

[7] Зарубежные славяне и Россия. Документы архива М. Ф. Раевского. 40–80 годы XIX века. Москва. 1975.; *Матула, В. – Чуркина, И. В.:* Архив М. Ф. Раевского, как источник по истории связей между славистами России и Австрии 40–70 годы XIX в.), Культура и общество в эпоху становления наций. Москва. 1974. 166–178.

[8] *Vavro, J.:* Jan Herkel' a Safarikova kritika jeho vseslovanskej gramatiky. (The critic by Safarik on Jan Herkel' and the old Slavonic genetics.), In: Sbornik filozofickej fakulty Univerzity P. J. Safárika v Presove 1961.

[9] An excellent explanation for the process of spreading and different interpretation of various technical terms are given by: *Поршнев, Б.:* Социальная психология и история. Москва. 1971.

[10] *Шебунин, А. Н.:* Европейская контр-революция в первой половине XIX века. Ленинград. 1925. 192–211.

[11] F. Wollman points to this phenomenon in his „Slavism and Antislavism at the time of the peoples' spring: *F. Wollman:* Slavismy a antislavismy za jarà národů. Praha 1968.

[12] It is not easy to give an explanation for the social background of this mystical appearance; the solution may be is the material within the Polish church history complemented with the use of the results of mass psychology.

[13] *Бакунин, М. А.:* Собрание сочинений и писем. Москва. 1935. IV. 132–134.

[14] *Пыпин, А. Н.:* Мои заметки, с приложением статей «Два месяца в Праге» и «Вячеслав Ганка». Москва. 1910. 149–151, 161–179.

[15] Many an examples appear in his writing to prove the circunstances that the first ideologists of Panslavism at the beginning had to persuade every man separately: *Murko, M.:* Ján Kollár. Ljubljana 1894–1897. I–II., and *В. Ягич:* История славянской филологии. Санктпетерубург.1910.

[16] Slovansky sjezd v Praze roku 1848. Sbirka dokumentu. K vydáni připravil Dr. Václav Žacek. (The Slav Congress in Prague, in 1848. Prepared for the press.) Praha 1958. 544– –561.

[17] *Kazbunda, V.:* Pout' Cehův do Moskvy. (The way of Checs to Moscow.) Praha 1926.

[18] *Walickij, A.:* W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii. (Within a conservative utpoy.) Warszawa 1964.; *Christoff, P.:* An Introduction to Nineteenth Century. Russian Salvophilism. Paris 1972. *Кулешов, В. И.:* Славянофилы и русская литература. Москва. 1976.

[19] *Венгеров, С. А.:* Собрание сочинений. Санктпетербург. 1912. III. 12–34:

[20] *Хомяков, А. С.:* Сочинения. Москва. 1911. I. 120–124, 373–404.

[21] *Державин, Н.:* Герцен и славянофилы. Историк-марксист. 1939. I. 120–122.

[22] *Лемке, М.:* Очерки по истории русской цензуры и журналистики XIX столетия. Санктпетербург. 1904. 2–11.

[23] Since Plehanov the history have not dealt with the social determinedness of their philosophy.

[24] *Никитин, С. А.:* Славянские комитеты в России 1858–1876. Москва. 1961.

[25] *Ягич, В.:* История славянской филологии. Санктпетербург. 1910. *Францев, В. А.:* Письма Вацлаву Ганке из Славянских земель. Варшава. 1905.

[26] Slovanskú vzájemnost (1836–1936). (Slavonic mutuality (1836–1936). Sbornik praci k 100 vyroci vydání rozpravy Jana Kollara o slovanske vzájemnosti. (Collection of articles. On the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the study published by Jan Kollar on the Slavic mutuality.) Praha 1938.; *Rozenbaum, K.:* Koncepcia slovanskej vzájómnosti v obdobi P. J. Safárika a Jana Kollára. (The conception of the slavic mutuality in the light of Safarik and Kollar.) Historický časopis, 1960.

[27] *Лещиловская, И. И.:* Иллиризм. Москва. 1968.; *Sidak, J.:* Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoleca. (Studies from the Croatian History of the XIX. century.) Zagreb 1973.

[28] Arató points to this in a polemic way: 373–440.

[29] *Handelsman, M.:* Czartoryski, Nicolas I. et la question du Proche-Orient. Varsovie 1933.

[30] *Lewak, A.:* Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji. (The History of Polish Emigration in Turkey.) Warszawa 1935.

[31] *Beauvois, D.:* U zródel panslawismu: polskie oswiecenie i slowianczczyzna (1795–1820). (With the birth of panslavism: Polish enlightment and the Slavs.) In: Revue des études sllaves. Communications de la délégation francaise au VIII[e] Congrés International des Slavistes. Zagreb (3–9 septembre 1978) 33–42.

[32] *Lednicki, W.:* Mickiewicz at the collége de France, in: The Slavonic and East European Review 1941. XX. 149–172.

[33] *Žacek, V.:* Die Rolle des Austroslawismus in der Politik der österreichischen Slawen, in: L'udovit Štur und die Slawische Wechselseitigkeit. Bratislava 1969. 127–147.

[34] This has come to light even from the writings of Palacki with Hungary. *Pražák, R.:* Palacky a Mad'ari pred rokem. 1848. (Palacký and the Hungarians before the year 1848.) in: Casopis Matice moravské 1958.

[35] *Arató, E.:* Egykorú demokratikus nézetek az 1848–1849 évi magyarországi forradalomról és ellenforradalomról. (Former democratic views the revolution and counterrevolution of 1848–1849 in Hungary.) Budapest, 1971.

[36] *Николаевский, Б.:* Взгляды М. А. Бакунина на положение дел в России в 1849 г. Летописи марксизма. Москва. 1929. IX–X.

[37] *Нечкина, М.:* Общество Соединенных Славян. Москва – Ленинград 1927.

[38] *Wollmann, F.:* Slovanstvi Šafarikovo a Sefčenkovo. (Slavism of Safarik and Sevcenko.) In: Slavia 1961 (30).

[39] *Зайончковский, П. А.:* Кириллo – Мефодиевское общество. Москва. 1959.

[40] *Кеневич, Ст.:* Лелевель. Москва. 1970; Попков В. С.: Польский ученый и революционер Йоахим Лелевель. Москва. 1974.

[41] *Kun, M. – Fodor, I.:* Bakounine et George Sand. In: Europe 1978/III.

[42] *Orton, L. D.:* The Echo of Bakunin's Appeal to the Slavs (1848), in: Canadian – American Slavic Studies 1976 Winter, 498.

[43] *Сафаров, Г.:* Маркс о национально – колониальном вопросе Москва. 1934. 110.

[44] *Kun M.:* Bakunin and Hungary (1848–1865). In: Canadian – American Slavic Studies 1976 Winter, 511–513.